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Abstract: This paper presents a critical review and analysis of issues in implementing electronic data and 
information sharing frameworks in organizations involved in response activities during natural disasters. 
The latest technological advances, opportunities, barriers and challenges are identified and discussed. A 
case study in New Zealand examines the process and steps to conceive the electronic data and information 
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framework is investigated. Preliminary results show that considerable performance gains in response 
activities during natural disasters can be achieved if technology is employed according to organizations’ 
needs. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Response activities to natural disasters involve several organizations collecting, 
processing and sharing data and information that support resource allocations to minimize 
societal and economic damages. In order to act in a coordinate and efficient way, 
organizations require access to data and information characterizing the natural disaster’s 
intensity, location and related damages as well as the availability of human and physical 
resources. Data and information can be originated from multiple organizations that are 
ultimately shared and made available to coordinating authorities such as the civil defence, 
army forces, lifeline organisations, local and regional authorities, etc. Furthermore, intra-
organizational exchange of data and information may occur according to several layers of 
responsibilities and territorial jurisdiction. Through inter and intra organizational exchange 
and sharing of data and information decisions are made and implemented resulting in the 
mobilization of personnel and equipment accordingly to assessed needs and priorities.  
A critical review and analysis of issues in implementing electronic data and information 
sharing frameworks in organizations involved in response activities during natural disasters is 
presented. Based upon the examination of the scientific literature and recent natural disaster 
response reports as well as the latest technological advances, opportunities, barriers and 
challenges are identified and discussed. These are used in a New Zealand case study in which 
the implementation of an electronic data and information sharing framework in a roading 
authority organization is examined. This case study concentrates in presenting the process and 
the steps taken to conceive the electronic data and information framework and to involve the 
roading authority organizations as well as the preliminary results that have shown 
considerable performance gains in response activities during natural disasters.  
This paper is divided into four sections. After this brief introduction, section two 
examines the scientific and technical reports covering organizational issues in emergency 
response in order to identify opportunities, barriers and challenges to the implementation of 
data/information sharing practices. Section three focuses in investigating these issues in the 
New Zealand context of emergency management. Finally, section four presents the discussion 
and conclusion based upon the findings of previous sections.  
 
2.  ORGANIZATIONAL ISSUES IN EMERGENCY RESPONSE  
Recently, a series of natural and man-made disasters has prompted the production of 
reports covering a wide range of topics ranging from human and social behavior to artificial 
intelligence applied in resources allocation. However, intra and inter organizational issues in 
emergency response are concentrated into three main topics, namely: organizational 
coordination; emergent technologies and techniques in data/information processing; and 
evacuation planning.  
Almost unanimously, various scholars and emergency management practitioners have 
indicated that lack of coordination reduces the response efficiency. At the macro level, some 
claim that the whole process of emergency management has to be integrated with urban and 
regional activities [1] [2]. Montoya and Masser [3] present a case study in Cartago, Costa Rica in 
which gaps in current urban planning framework and practices are identified. On the other 
hand, it is often claimed that organizational coordination is also dependent on cultural 
background. For example Marincioni [4] uses a cross-cultural perspective to clarify the 
relationship between two cultures and their different patterns of response to extreme flood 
events. The results showed that the different human responses observed in floods were linked 
to basic differences in four cultural elements: experience with floods; socio-political traditions 
and organization; levels of integration within the community and perception of the physical 
environment. At the operational level, the Turkish experience with the 1999 earthquake [5], 
fire events in Quebec, Canada [6] and United States’ CERTs [7] highlight the importance of 
coordination and the problematic nature of multi-organisational collaboration in disasters  
Recent developments in data/information processing and tools have also been captured in 
the literature. On one hand, it is observed a growing concern over the need to obtain and share 
data during emergency events. Popkin and Rubbin [8] make an informal assessment of United 
States’ Natural Hazards Research and Applications information Center (NHRAIC), while 
Lindell et al. [9] and Hwang et al [10] examined 97 Texas government agencies’ access to 
information about hazards in their communities and concluded that printed products are still 
used more extensively than internet products. Furthermore, Mendonca and Wallace [11] present 
a method for describing both context and substance of improvisation during the response 
phase. Slayton [12] highlights the need to identify available sources of information within each 
participating agency and five key factors that affect the success of local collaborative efforts 
(the climate in which the initiative begins; the processes used to develop trust and handle 
conflict; the people involved; the policies that support or inhibit their efforts; the availability 
of resources to enable their effects to continue).  
Many have already adopted Geographical Information Systems (GIS), Global Position 
Systems (GPS) and Remote Sensing as essential instruments in emergency management and 
response activities. Zhang et al [13] present an overview of the Chinese system used to asses 
damage and provide relief during natural disasters based upon Remote Sensing, GIS and GPS. 
Hecker et al [14] describes damages and organizational consequences of the Hurricane Hugo 
and how the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers is taking advantage of GIS and GPS in its 
activities. Waring et al [15] introduces the public health response to tropical storm Allison in 
the Houston area, USA and the need to quickly evaluate the immediate health and medical 
needs of the community would not have been possible without the utilization of GIS 
methodology. GIS has been also applied in: decision-making processes [16] [17], risk and 
vulnerability assessments [18] [19], network operations and traffic management [20] [21].  
Despite considerable progress achieved in recent years, research and implementation 
efforts towards utilizing the full potential available in GIS should be contemplated. Many 
scholars have indicated that geo-spatial modelling provided in most commercial GIS desktop 
software is inefficient, because they are based on very simplistic representation of response 
systems characteristics, and do not include multiple inter-relationships observed in reality [22]. 
This provides a very static representation of the variables that contribute to decision-making 
activities. On the other hand, there are serious concerns about the isolationist tendency 
adopted by some emergency services. It is very often observed that each organisation will 
have its own GIS developed according to its specific needs, without contemplating 
data/information sharing needs. For example, Amdahl [23] describes GIS applications in 
disaster response, which are very efficient in identifying risks before and after response, but 
limited in dealing with the dynamic flow of data and information during the response 
activities. In a few cases, organisations will purchase GIS software without even analyzing 
whether or not the package will suit its needs during emergency events [15] [24]. Furthermore, in 
Briton’s words [25] “…a key need now is making effective and efficient use of new 
technologies for gathering and evaluating information to best target response and relief 
efforts…. Nevertheless, the challenge is to ensure the means exist for sharing information 
across all agencies, not just in terms of the formats used but also overcoming ownership and 
funding issues. Central to this, however, is the need to replace a focus on organisational 
arrangements to focus on resource arrangements to a focus on resource arrangements based on 
potential hazards consequences…” 
The expansion and subsequent reliance on recent telecommunication advances have been 
also incorporated in the emergency response context [26] in terms of wireless communications, 
internet and integrated technologies for data exchange. Heavy telephone use by general 
population caused sudden and sever congestion in the phone system during the Kobe 
earthquake and the September 11 attacks in New York have motivated Fujiwara and 
Watanabe [27] to conceive an ad hoc networking scheme and routing for emergency 
communications, in which the objective of the network is to collect damage assessment 
information quickly and stably in a disaster, using a hybrid wireless network, ad hoc networks 
and cellular network to maintain connectivity between a base station and nodes even in a 
disaster. Combining GIS, GPS and telecommunication capabilities, Laurini [28] describes 
various applications of Telegeomonitoring in traffic management on toll motorways, fleet 
management, transport of hazardous materials, river pollution and risk monitoring. In the 
same direction, Gordin [29] describes applications of GIS software combined with wireless 
mobile phone networks in the USA. Telecommunications advances have also contribute to 
popularization of internet-based applications. Harder [30] describes a series of applications in 
which maps are made available on internet. Gruntfest and Weber [31] reports on the growing 
value of internet resources for the emergency management profession.  
Evacuation studies have also occupied a considerable part of the technical and scientific 
literature. Jafari et al [32] present a survey of various approaches and technologies being 
developed and used for evacuation planning and emergency management. They divide efforts 
into evacuation planning and emergency management. Evacuation planning covers: the 
analysis of site analysis consulting (EPlan and BTG), simulation (EXODUS, OREMS, PedGo, 
Assisted Evacuation Simulation, SEVEX, CyberSim) and Training. In emergency 
management, High-Level Architecture (HLA), Multi-agent systems to support an escalating 
non-combatant evacuation operation (NEO) and E-Team software packages can be 
highlighted. On the modeling side, Gladwin et al [33] focus in individual and household 
hurricane evacuation behavior using ethnographic decision tree analysis, based on interviews 
with Miami, USA, residents who had been in South Florida during both Hurricanes Andrew 
in 19912 and Erin in 1995. Their results show that the model can better inform emergency 
managers. Other similar initiatives in modeling are presented in [34] [35] [36] [37]. Goldblatt and 
Weinisch [38] describe the benefits of developing systems for training and effective response in 
evacuation planning.  
In the inter and intra organizational data/information sharing context, this review 
demonstrates that outstanding advances have been achieved, but considerable challenges 
ahead can be pictured in terms of adopting knowledge and information management theory 
and techniques [39]. Throughout this review, it can be observed that very limited attention has 
been given to conducting comprehensive analyses about the nature and background of 
involved organisations; the characteristics of their involvement; their data/information needs, 
their data/information sharing needs and how organisations should share data/information.  
 
3.  NEW ZEALAND’S EMERGENCY RESPONSE AND ORGANISATIONAL DATA 
SHARING  
According to Cole et al [40] no large-scale events have been observed necessary in New 
Zealand, possibly due to the short history of European settlement (160 years). The common 
incidents in New Zealand have been short-lived, and relatively small scale, associated with 
storms and floods, but there have been three events: the 1886AD eruption of Tarawera, 1931 
Hawkes Bay earthquake and 1968 Inangahua earthquake. According to Briton and Clark [1] 
over the last 50 years, less than 3 people a year have died in natural disasters, but annual flood 
losses may amount to NZ$180 million and earthquake losses about NZ$15 million. In the 
most recent event (2004) flooding in the Manuatu-Wanganui area (4 bridges destroyed, 21 
seriously damaged, 2500 people displaced, costs on business disruption close to NZ$400 
million) [41]. 
In New Zealand, the Ministry of Civil Defence and Emergency Management (MCDEM) 
is a semi-autonomous body within the Department of Internal Affairs, which is responsible to 
ensure the preparedness of the New Zealand community for any natural and technological 
hazards or disasters [1]. Created in 1999, MCDEM provides policy advice to the Government 
[42]
. In 2002, a Civil Defence act established a national and regional framework in which 
emergency management strategy and plan were adopted. This act requires that every local 
authority has to plan and provide for Civil Defence and Emergency Management (CDEM) 
within its district and to ensure that it is able to function to the fullest possible extent, even 
though this may be at a reduced level, during and after an emergency. The MCDEM works in 
coordination with local and regional governments, utilities and the emergency services 
involved in CDEM. The MCDEM’s Director acts as Chief Executive of the Ministry in its 
day-to-day operations. In cases of national emergencies, the Director has special powers as 
defined in the legislation. The MCDEM consist of different units: Policy Unit; 
Communications Unit; Corporate and Development Unit; Readiness Unit and Capability Unit.  
In the event of Civil Defence emergency declaration, the local Civil Defence controller, 
representing the MCDEM, takes control and makes decision about the response actions after 
communication and consultation with other lifeline organizations like hospitals, fire services, 
police, transportation organizations, telecommunication organizations, media, local authorities, 
regional authorities, waste water organizations etc). The MCDEM team interacts with these 
lifeline organizations to make the decisions on prioritization of response activities. The 
data/information from all the organizations is expected to be shared with the MCDEM team 
for facilitating decision making. The organizations involved in the response activities, provide 
data/information to MCDEM and act as per the instructions from it. 
Based on this backdrop, data/information sharing issues specific to a New Zealand 
roading organization (Transit NZ) responding to a natural hazard event (Matata township 
flooding) are identified. The following sub-sections present the description of the roading 
organization and its interactions with the MCDEM, the chronological sequence of response 
actions and their respective data/information sharing observed in situ, and finally a potential 
framework for data/information sharing is introduced and discussed.  
 
3.1 New Zealand roading organization and its interactions with the MCDEM 
New Zealand has about 10 thousand kilometres of state highway network. These roads 
are a national asset worth approximately NZ$12 billion and Transit NZ is responsible for 
maintaining these assets. 56 % of the annual budget is allocated for the maintenance and 
rehabilitation of the existing roads. Typically, Transit NZ appoints the Consultants for the 
technical services and the Contractors for carrying out the physical works determine service 
orders according to Transit NZ Regional office’s directives. Service orders are then 
communicated to Transit NZ regional contractors that are responsible for road maintenance 
activities [43].  
During an emergency situation, it is the responsibility of the contractor to carry out the 
physical repairs and reopen the road to the traffic as soon as possible. The consultants are 
mainly involved in providing the technical details and strategic advice to the contractors. The 
consultants also interact with representatives of MCDEM and Transit NZ.  
The emergency situations are classified into 3 levels according to time required for the 
road reopening. They are the small, medium and large events. Based on emergency procedure 
manuals [43], Table 1 summarises Transit NZ’s regional office involvement and 
interrelationship with other organizations. 
Table 1. Transit NZ participation for different types of events.  
  
 Type of Emergency  
  Small Medium Large 
 
Local/Regional 
Authorities 
Local Roads and 
Infrastructure  
Local Roads and 
Infrastructure. 
Local Roads and 
Infrastructure. 
 
 
 
 
Organisations 
 
 
Transit NZ 
Stand-by unless the 
emergency affects 
SH system  
SH Emergency 
Procedure and 
Contingency Plan 
fully applied. 
SH Emergency Procedure and 
Contingency Plan used are 
partially applied. 
 
 
 
 
Civil Defence (CD) 
N/A 
- CD Head Quarters 
(CDHQ) plays a 
monitoring role; and 
- Link CDHQ – info 
where and when 
(depends on the 
event). 
Civil Emergency declared 
In a large event refers to a situation in which severe damage is observed and the Civil 
Defence dictates the priorities for response and recovery activities. When an emergency is 
declared during a large event, Transit NZ plays a complementary role. Transit NZ 
headquarters in Wellington is also involved in a large event and it reports to Land Transport 
NZ and Ministry of Transport (MOT). In events with Civil Defence Emergency declaration, 
MCDEM takes control of actions and all organizations have to operate as per the directions of 
the Civil Defence. In these situations, Transit NZ also interacts with the community through 
individuals, external organisations telecommunication, energy, water, hospitals and the media). 
In Figure 1, the square box indicates roading organizations involved for small and medium 
events whereas for large events, all the roading organizations in the dotted rectangle along 
with Civil Defence Emergency services and MCDEM are involved in the response activities. 
  
Emergency
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Event
Medium
Event
Large
Event
Roading organizations involved
Consultants
Contractors Transit NZ
Transit Headquarters
Land Transport NZ
Ministry of Transport
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Local 
Authorities
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services
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Fig. 1 Levels of Emergency and roading organizations involved 
 
Transit NZ response activities can be divided into 6 phases. They are: (1) event warning; 
(2) event observation; (3) event assessment; (4) organization action; (5) organization reporting; 
(6) organizations re-evaluation. At the end of phase (6) the outcomes are used to decide 
whether response is over or should it be continued from phase (3). During each phase, 
different organizations are involved. In the phase (1) the external organizations such as Crown 
Research Institutes like National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research (NIWA), 
Geological and Nuclear Sciences (GNS), Meteorological Services (MetService NZ), regional 
and local councils provide initial warning and their updates. After the event, the contractor 
along with external organizations and Public verify the initial damages caused to the 
transportation system (pavement and bridge collapses, obstruction of lanes, damages to traffic 
signs and controls, etc.). This is part of phase 2 (event observation). Depending on the extent 
of damage, these conditions are reported to the consultants, Transit NZ, Local/Regional 
Authorities, Civil Defence, and other lifeline organizations. In the subsequent phase (event 
assessment), again depending on the type of the emergency all the organizations except 
external organizations and public are involved and the decision is made by them in the next 
phase. In phase 4 (resource deployment) the same organizations deploy their physical and 
personnel resources according to their response responsibilities. Most part of the field 
operation is conducted by the contractors in small and medium events and in large events, 
Civil Defence Controller, lifeline organizations and Local/Regional Authorities are also 
involved. These actions are supervised by the consultant and Transit NZ along with Civil 
Defence, Local/Regional Authorities and lifeline organizations depending on the damage level. 
In phase 5, the reports are prepared by the contractor, Civil Defence, Local/Regional 
Authorities and lifeline organizations describing the conditions after initial round of measures 
and also development of the original event (better information about damages, more events, 
etc.). These reports are then taken into consideration during phase 6 (efficiency assessment) in 
which the organizations compute measures and their efficiency. Finally decision making on 
whether to continue or stop response activities depending on the efficiency assessment is 
conducted. If a decision is made to continue, the process restarts from phase 3. 
 
3.2 Roading organization’s response in the Matata township flooding event 
Matata is a seaside village of approximately 500 people in the Bay of Plenty region, 
North Island of New Zealand as shown in Figure 2. Matata is located halfway between 
Whakatane, which is a forestry industry region, and Tauranga, where one of the busiest ports 
of New Zealand is located. Whakatane and Tauranga are connected by railway and road, 
where the State Highway (SH) 2 is the most important part of network with observed daily 
heavy traffic on both directions.  
On the evening of May 16, 2005, MetService issued a heavy rain warning to the local 
(Whakatane District Council) and regional (Bay of Plenty Regional Council) authorities as 
well as to all infrastructure and lifelines providers in the region, including Transit NZ offices 
in Hamilton and Gisborne.  
(a) (b) 
Fig. 2 Location maps: (a) New Zealand and affected region; (b) Matata Township 
 
On the early hours of May 17, Transit NZ area engineer and the consultant engineer, who 
were coincidently meeting in Whakatane, received initial reports from the local community 
and Transit NZ contractors about partial road closures on SH 2 due to water on the road 
surface and localized slips blocking the traffic. Additional Transit NZ contractor’s crew was 
mobilized from various parts of the region via mobile phone. Reopening of the SH 2 occurred 
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at 4:30 am, but during road inspection Transit NZ area engineer and consultant engineer 
witnessed at 7:30 am the washout of one bridge embankment. Subsequent reports from road 
users about more washouts prompted the Transit NZ area engineer and the consultant engineer 
to hire a helicopter in Whakatane and conduct a fly-over inspection. Immediately after the 
inspection, complete road closure of SH 2 was declared and supplementary personnel and 
equipment from the Transit NZ contractor were requested.  
Up to that point in time, communications and exchange/sharing of data and information 
were very limited. Transit NZ Headquarters in Wellington had been informed of the road 
closure, without any precise estimation of the reopening time. The area engineer liaised with 
local and regional councils sharing the same level of information available to Transit NZ 
Headquarters. Press releases were given to the media about the road closures. Interaction 
between the area engineer and the consultant engineer occurred almost instantly as both were 
in situ coordinating and making decisions together. The consultant engineer, originally based 
in the Whakatane, reported back to office through mobile phone and/or using his deputy road 
technician. Consultant’s reports were used to produce maps of road closures and initial 
estimates of damages and costs. Transmitted data comprised very general instructions 
referring to general road assets per kilometre. No specific data on previous road asset 
conditions (e.g. location and characteristics of roading elements) was made available to the 
involved parties (Transit NZ, consultant and contractors).  
On May 18 at 3:50 pm, Civil Defence Emergency was Western Bay of Plenty Emergency 
Management Office and subsequently the Whakatane District Council also declared a state of 
local emergency for the Edgecumbe- Tarawera Ward (Matata township) at 6:43pm, May 18th. 
Late that night, a band of intense rain passed over the catchments behind Matata and it 
triggered many landslips (debris avalanche), which destroyed 27 homes and seriously 
damaged 87 properties [44]. Initial response actions commenced immediately, because 
resources were already available for dealing with road closures in the area. However, a major 
drawback was the lack of suitable gear to operate during the night, because available batteries 
for spotlights presented fault.  
The landslips in Matata and complete closure of SH 2, which made created difficulties in 
transporting equipment and personnel from Tauranga. Therefore, alternative routes through 
mountainous areas had to be used, which incurred in delays in the response actions. On May 
20th, SH 2 was partially open to heavy and commercial traffic operating during the nigh (5 pm 
to 5 am). On May 30th, the SH 2 was completely reopened to general traffic. At that point in 
time, Transit NZ had no specific assessment on road works costs.  
During the response activities, we observed a few issues and perceptions through the 
interaction with Transit NZ, consultants and contractors. In comparison with previous events, 
2005 flooding and damages much more localized, which meant that the allocation of 
resources was not very complex. The prioritization process was rather simplified, consisting 
of visual inspection in the consultant deputy technician together with the contractor 
representative listed assets and decided on a ranking and treatment options, without 
considering the previous state of the assets and costs. Furthermore on information about assets, 
the Transit NZ consultant noted that there would be clear gain in efficiency if contractors 
knew the exact location and characteristics of the roading elements such as signage, culvert, 
etc. This mainly reflects the limitations of the Road Assessment Maintenance Management 
(RAMM) employed in Transit NZ daily operations. Ironically, contractors and consultants 
managed to download television reports about the events from internet using their mobile 
phones, but they were unable to know what was underneath the mud.  
An overview of communications and of data/information exchange/sharing during the 
Matata events indicates that informal linkages and assessment were predominately observed. 
Involved roading organisations depended heavily on individuals’ previous knowledge about 
the area, the assets. Obviously, previous knowledge was very important, but there are many 
concerns about how it was rationally and efficiently employed to solve complex problems. 
Moreover, “common sense” overwriting information (or lack of it) was constantly employed. 
On the other hand, the current information system (RAMM) was perceived as not suitable to 
cope with the dynamic nature of such an event. This has probably forced Transit NZ, 
contractors and consultants to respond as observed.  
 
3.3 A potential framework for data/information sharing and implementation issues 
within Transit NZ 
Based upon the need for efficient inter and intra Transit NZ data/information sharing, a 
conceptual framework is presented. Following the concepts of knowledge and information 
management [39], the first step is to identify the information needs of the involved organization. 
Using the Integrated DEFination (IDEF0) modelling language (semantics and syntax) and 
considering the examination of Transit NZ emergency procedures and reports, the information 
needs for each response phase and involved organization were identified as shown in Table 2. 
These needs were considered in the conception of an information flow framework [45] that is 
presented in Figure 3.  
This information framework was applied to a case study in the South Island of New 
Zealand. Results show that reduction in time and cost of emergency response activities could 
be reached if the conceptual framework were implemented. The total cost of road closures per 
year is estimated to be approximately 3 million dollars. By using the data/information 
framework, the cost of road closures can be reduced to 2.7 million dollars. In the best case 
scenario, it would generate 5.53% (NZ$ 162,342) reduction while the worst case scenario 
would generate a reduction of 1.70% (NZ$ 49,952) [45]. 
The implementation of such a framework would require personnel training, equipment 
purchase (PDA or mobile phones with GPS receiver units, PC data projectors for Transit NZ 
control rooms), considerable commitment in changing the organizational culture and further 
technological and methodological advances. Both training and equipment can be justified 
based upon the reduction of time and costs as well as with the minimization of social and 
economic disruption. Nevertheless, preliminary findings not only about Transit NZ but also 
on New Zealand organizations indicate that there is a need for clear understanding and 
communication of intra-organisational responsibilities and duties across divisional and 
geographical boundaries [46]. As for the technological and methodological advances, major 
natural disasters events require the manipulation of a large variety of data sets for national, 
regional, local and site specific levels. This has to be seriously taken into consideration 
because speed and size of each data set will certainly interfere with the final data/information 
sharing outcome. Specific processing technology to efficiently manipulate the data sets has to 
be developed and implemented. Fortunately, New Zealand has a solid culture of geospatial 
data collection and storage, which is provided by Land Information New Zealand (LINZ).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Transit NZ and response partners’ information needs in response activities 
 Regional Consultant info needs Regional Contractor info needs Transit NZ Regional Office info needs CD info needs 
Event 
Occurrence 
 -Potential damaged area/region 
-Type of event 
-Intensity and expected duration 
-Available resources 
  
Event 
Observation 
-Damaged area/region 
-Type of event  
-Damaged asset type  
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors’ resources 
-CD emergency declaration? 
-Damaged area/region 
-Type of event 
-Attributes of potentially damaged assets 
(Location; Original condition; 
Characteristics; Costs; Priority 
Repair availability). 
 
-Damaged area/region and event type 
-Damaged asset type; 
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors/Consultants’ available resources 
-Initial road closure time/ costs estimation 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
 
Event 
Assessment 
Comparison before and after / damaged asset 
Location 
Original condition 
Characteristics 
Treatment options 
Costs 
Priority 
Repair availability 
-Contractors’ available resources 
 -Report on before and after / damaged asset 
-Summary of damaged assets per type 
-Summary of treatment options 
-Summary of Costs/Priorities 
Repair availability 
-Consultants and contractors available resources 
-Initial road closure time estimation 
-Initial cost estimation 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
-Report on road closures 
(Location; Partial/complete; 
Expected road opening 
-Consultants and contractors 
available resources 
-Initial cost estimation 
Resources 
Deployment 
-Location of Contractors’ equipment and personnel 
-Deployment times 
-Allocation plan of resources and personnel per 
damaged asset (Location; Original condition; 
Characteristics; Treatment; Priority; Effectiveness) 
-Traffic management plan 
MCDEM emergency declaration? 
-Allocation plan of resources and 
personnel per damaged asset (Location; 
Original condition; Characteristics; 
Treatment; Priority; Effectiveness) 
-Deployment times 
-Traffic management plan 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
  
Event 
Reporting 
Damaged area/region 
-Attributes of damaged assets: (Location; 
Original/Current conditions; Characteristics; 
Treatment; Costs; Priorities; Repair availability) 
Damaged asset type  
Attributes of damaged assets: (Location; 
Original/Current conditions; 
Characteristics; Treatment; Costs; 
Priorities; Repair availability) 
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors’ available resources 
-Damaged asset type  
-Partial or complete road closure 
-Alternative roads 
-Traffic flow composition 
-Contractors/Consultants’ available resources 
-Road closure time/costs estimation 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
 
 
Event Re-
assessment 
-Comparison before and after / damaged asset 
(Location; Original condition; Characteristics; 
Treatment options; Costs; Priority; Repair 
availability) 
-Contractors’ available resources 
Stop response/Initiate Recovery mode/Continue 
Response? 
 -Report on before and after / damaged asset 
-Summary of damaged assets per type, treatment options, 
Costs and Priorities 
-Repair availability 
-Consultants and contractors available resources 
-Initial road closure time  cost estimation 
-Stop response/Initiate Recovery mode/Continue Response? 
-MCDEM emergency declaration? 
-Report on road closures 
(Location; Partial/complete; 
Expected road opening 
-Consultants and contractors 
available resources 
-Initial cost estimation 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3 Information flow framework for roading organizations 
4. CONCLUSION 
A major outcome of this research work is that perceived barriers can be reduced if 
technology is employed according to organizations’ needs rather than the other way around. 
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This is possible by involving end-users during all development stages of the electronic data 
and information sharing frameworks. 
From the review of the scientific and technical literature, it can be observed that 
considerable opportunities lay in exploring new paradigms emergency response with 
extensive telecommunications and geo-spatial technologies. On the other hand, the case study 
of the roading organizations in New Zealand has indicated that potential has already been 
observed and quantified, but implementation of response systems require much more than 
technology. Organisational reorientation is also fundamental to change misperceptions and 
pre-conceived paradigms that affect the efficiency of emergency response.  
There are various and complex challenges in terms of developing technological and 
methodological solutions that are according to current and future needs, without 
underestimating the need for long-term commitments from all involved parties. 
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